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LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPACE COMMUNICATIONS
AND SPACE SURVEILLANCE
By

JEROME KRAUSt

M

UCH of man's early activity in space deals with communications
and surveillance, which are based on very similar technologies. The
law relating to both of them has been overcast with the problem of
sovereignty. Nevertheless, significant insights are obtainable by considering technical foundations before introducing the element of sovereignty.
The tendency of these two technologies to merge, suggests the possibility that the same legal principles may be applied to both. After an
examination of intent, a principal factor tending to distinguish communications from surveillance, a tentative code for users of the electromagnetic spectrum is proposed and tested against both technical trends and
legal viewpoints.
I.

TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS

In the form of speech and observation, communications and surveillance are the primary tools of learning. Before the seventeenth century,
communications and surveillance were limited in effectiveness substantially
to how far a man could hear and see. But the invention of the telescope
provided greatly increased efficiency of surveillance at a distance. Nineteenth and twentieth century development in electromagnetic wave propagation and modulation made possible communication at a distance for
which many totally new and widespread forms were found The telegraph
and telephone were developed in the nineteenth century, point-to-point
radio in the first decade and entertainment broadcasting in the second
and third decades of the twentieth century.
Surveillance at a distance failed to exhibit the remarkable development
which communications experienced in the nineteenth century. The shape
of the future became apparent, however, when eighteenth and nineteenth
century man took his optical instruments aloft in balloons to gain longer
lines of sight to distant objects on earth.' Not until World War I were
new tools of surveillance-aerial photography and infrared detectiondeveloped, and another generation was to elapse before radio techniques
in the form of radar, radio astronomy, and direction finding were to be
applied to surveillance. Since man has thrust into space, the technologists
of communications and surveillance have been quick to reap the geometrical advantage of placing their equipments high above the earth's
surface.
t Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars; A.B., University of Chicago, 1942;
B.S. in E.E., University of Illinois, 1947; LL.B., The George Washington University, 1953; ITT
Federal Laboratories, Nutley, New Jersey. This paper was presented to The American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Summer Meeting, Los Angeles, California, June 17-20, 1963.
'See Godding, The International Telecommunications Union, Leyden (1952), for bibliography
on early communications.
'The first successful balloon was launched in France in 1783 and first used for military
surveillance in 1794. See Balloon, Encyclopedia Britannica.
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Basic techniques which will have far reaching effects on both these
technologies continue to be developed. A most profound change in technology has occurred as a result of the discovery of coherent light generation in the form of the laser.' As a result, the unity of the electromagnetic
spectrum, first postulated by Maxwell in the 1870's, has become a functional reality. Surveillance, once dependent wholly on optics and the
visible portion of the spectrum, and communications, once dependent
upon the radio frequencies, are now seen to be based on the entire electromagnetic spectrum from the very low frequencies through infrared,
visible light, ultraviolet, X-Rays, and gamma rays.
Whereas acoustic and seismic waves play important roles in communication and surveillance on the earth or in the atmosphere, in the airless
regions of space, primarily the electromagnetic wave is useful. The law
of space communications and space surveillance, therefore, in its simplest
manifestation, deals with the effects and implications of using the electromagnetic spectrum.
Electromagnetic propagation in space tends to emphasize points easily
forgotten on the earth's surface. Propagation in straight lines is the norm
of the universe. Propagation on curvilinear or irregular paths, such as on
the surface of the earth, are local aberrations dependent upon the composition of a planet and its atmosphere. Transmission in space over very long
distances is likely to be carried on at frequencies well above the microwave limits commonly used on earth. Because it becomes increasingly
more difficult to concentrate electromagnetic waves in narrow beams as
the frequency of the wave decreases, the use of microwave or lower
frequencies in space-to-space transmission may be limited. On the other
hand, frequencies above the microwave are attenuated severely in the
earth's atmosphere, thus making space-to-earth propagation or earthto-space propagation using frequencies above microwave difficult.' To
achieve penetration of the earth's atmosphere with infrared, visible light,
or higher frequencies, it is necessary to concentrate energy in a narrow
beam or to use very high energy sources. The sun is an example of the
latter.

II.

MODES OF OPERATION

Four modes of space communications are: ground-to-ground via space
relay, earth-to-space, space-to-earth and space-to-space.
In the next decade, much attention will be devoted to ground-toground communication via satellites. The success of Echo, Telstar, and
Relay satellites has been notable, although the West Ford orbiting needles
concept is yet to be proven. The techniques used are straight-forward
and well known. The satellite receives microwave signals from the earth
and reflects or retransmits them back to the earth, thus permitting communication of high quality without wires between two points on earth
'First suggested by Schawlow and Townes, Infrared and Optical Masers, 112 Physical Review
1940 (1958); the laser has developed very rapidly. Yariv and Gordon, The Laser, 51 Proceedings
IEEE 4 (1963), summarizes theory and applications. The great bandwidths potentially available
in the potrion of the spectrum opened up by the laser will make spectrum conservation of less
concern than at microwave and lower frequencies.
4
Kerr, Propagation of Short Radio Waves, 13 M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory Series 663 (1951).
See also Neuringer, Infrared Fundamentals and Techniques, 65 Electrical Manufacturing 111
(1960).
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well beyond the 500 mile limit of troposcatter communication systems."
Some of the discussions of this mode of space communications seem to
ignore the point that such communication is carried on between two
complex ground terminals and does not enable the ground transmitting
station to broadcast to millions of home radio receivers.
The second mode of space communications is one in which a station on
earth has established a communications link to a vehicle, a sounding-rocket,
a probe, or celestial body in space. In the link from ground to orbiting
vehicle, the need is one of directivity to enable reception of the command
or information signals. As probes or manned vehicles move farther out
into space, the problem of directivity will become an increasingly more
severe one if the station on earth is to retain its ability to communicate
reliably.
In the third mode of space communications, the space probe, vehicle,
or satellite will be communicating with an earth-based station. Because
of weight considerations the space-borne transmitter will tend to be as
simple as possible, and the complexities will be built into the ground-based
equipment. As the spacecraft moves farther out into space, only one or,
at the most, a few extremely large, sensitive receiver installations on earth
will be capable of receiving their emissions, such as the NASA/Jet
Propulsion Laboratory Deep Space Instrumentation Facility.! Transmitters
in unmanned vehicles cannot be turned off except by command from a
remote point or component failure. Thus, there exists the possibility of
generating interference from satellites whose useful life is ended, but
whose transmitters still operate.
Broadcasting from space requires placement of a relay station in a
satellite. The frequency required would probably be below 10 gc. in the
microwave or very-high-frequency region of the spectrum.7 Above about
10-15 gc., the attenuation in the earth's atmosphere becomes sufficiently
high to make a space-borne broadcast transmitter uneconomic.
In the fourth mode, space-to-space communications, the emphasis at
least until bases are established on the moon and other planets will be on
lightweight transmitting and receiving equipment. To achieve very long
range communications, frequencies beyond microwave will be required.
Highly directional beams will be used, and the transmission for the most
part will be incapable of penetrating the earth's atmosphere. Ultimately,
relay stations on the moon or on lunar or terrestrial satellites will be required to convert the microwave signals used for penetrating the earth's
atmosphere to the optical and higher frequency signals used in long
distance space communications.
Turning now to surveillance, major distinctions can be made between
passive systems and active systems. The traditional passive systems, such
as telescopes, binoculars, and cameras, are sensitive to visible light, but
a host of passive systems using other portions of the electromagnetic
spectrum are also available. Among these are the radio telescope, the infrared horizon sensor, and the ultraviolet detector. The most widely used
Parry, Equipment Configuration and Performance Criteria for Fully Optimized Tropospheric
Scatter System, CS-9 IRE Transactions on Communications Systems 427 (1961).
4
NASA/Lunar and Planetary, 11 Missiles and Rockets 122 (1962).
T Wiesner, Communications Using Earth Satellites, Lectures on Communications Systems 592
(E. J. Baghdady ed. 1961). See also Martin and Jacobs, Direct Broadcasting from Earth Satellites,
30 Telecommunication J. 11 (1963).
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active surveillance system is radar, which is now breaking out of its
microwave bonds and moving into the infrared and visible light region
by taking advantage of the capabilities of the laser.
The modes of space surveillance are earth-space, space-earth, and spacespace. The earth-space mode includes most of the astronomical activities"
as well as missile, satellite, probe, and space vehicle detection and tracking.
Both active (radar) and passive (radiometer, telescope, camera) equipments are used. Active systems will tend to be restricted to the portion
of the spectrum below 10 gc., because of atmospheric attenuation, but
passive systems are reliable up to ultraviolet frequencies. In the spaceearth mode of surveillance, passive equipments, chiefly cameras and radio
frequency radiometers, are much more popular than active equipments,
although the latter (radar) are used to some extent. Cameras have figured
prominently in the U-2 incident, recent U.S.-U.S.S.R. encounters in
Cuba, and discussions of photographic satellites.
A very important consideration in image-producing space-to-earth
systems is resolution of the image obtained. The greater the distance of
the sensor from the surface of the earth, the more difficult it is to achieve
fine resolution. Many conjectures have appeared in the open literature
concerning the minimum size object which could be photographed on
the ground from satellite heights.9 Whatever the answer may be, useful
information undoubtedly can be obtained from satellites. As coherent light
and, perhaps, gamma-ray radar becomes available, the limitations of
resolution of microwave radar will be overcome and such radar may
achieve limited usefulness in surveillance of the earth.
In the space-to-space mode, the same equipments are useful as in the
earth-space mode. The lack of atmosphere, however, makes passive surveillance systems using frequencies beyond visible light (ultraviolet,
X-Ray, and gamma ray) feasible. For the same reason, active systems
above microwave frequencies become much more useful. Also, the need
for long-range, lightweight radar makes the frequencies above microwave
very attractive. Some of the manifestations of space-to-space surveillance
are meteorological satellites, vehicle rendezvous radar, and satellite inspection. Significantly, sensors used for detecting cloud formations above
the earth also provide photographs of the earth's surface."0
In summary, the technical aspects of space communications and space
surveillance reveal the following points potentially significant for legal
development:
1. Communications and surveillance technologies tend to merge as the
entire range of the electromagnetic spectrum has been opened to both
technologies by the development of the laser.
2. The use of coherent waves at frequencies above microwave (infrared, ultraviolet, etc.) permits the use of higher and higher concentrations
of energy in communications and surveillance.
' See Wenk, Jr., Radio Frequency Control in Space Telecommunication, ch. IX, in which
the spectrum needs of radio astronomy is reviewed.
Capabilities and Limitations of Aerial Inspection, Inspection for Disarmament
'Levison,
59 (S. Melman ed. 1958) indicates some of the limitations of photoreconnaissance, particularly
from aircraft. Stewart, The New Optics, 4 International Science and Technology 23 (1962)
proposes that objects three inches apart might be resolvable from altitudes of 125 miles.
'o Tiros 6 Sends Excellent Photos; Surveys MA-8 Path, Storm Area, Aviation Week, Sept. 24,
1962, p. 41.
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3. The atmosphere of the earth severely attenuates frequencies above
about 10 gc.
4. The development of coherent light generation potentially makes
available millions of new communication channels and much higher
resolution active surveillance systems.
III. A TENTATIVE CODE
Although a natural consequence of point 1 of the technical summary
above is to attempt to combine the law of space communications and
space surveillance into a single set of principles, there is insufficient assurance that human activities flowing from these two technologies are
sufficiently similar to warrant such treatment. Not only have their historical developments differed, but they may be distinguishable on the basis
of intent.
Communications, developed primarily from civilian endeavors, is a
widely used and accepted technology which has been regulated by the
International Telecommunications Union and its predecessors for a century. Surveillance, on the other hand, with a larger military component in
its twentieth century development, has been considered somewhat sporadically by several international bodies having interest in only a small part
of surveillance technology. Although the aircraft conventions have peripherally affected surveillance by establishing rights in the airspace, and
organizations such as the World Meteorological Organization and the
International Astronomical Union are concerned with specific subject
matter, no counterpart to the Inter-national Telecommunications Union
exists.
Within recent years the equipments used for space applications have
tended to be interchangeable. Many radar transmitters with little modification can be used as communications transmitters. Radio telescopes are
useful not only in searching out the secrets of the cosmos, but also in
receiving signals from communications transmitters millions of miles from
earth. The visible light telescope, too, will be increasingly useful as a
communications as well as a surveillance receiver.
A theory of dissimilarity in historical background as a reason for
separate consideration of the law of surveillance and communications is
difficult to maintain because the magnitude of technical change inevitably
will cause convergence of their lines of development.
Superficially, the intent of users of space communications is identical
to that of users of space surveillance systems: to employ the informationcarrying properties of the electromagnetic spectrum. Traditionally, the
intent of the transmitting instrumentality of a communications system
could be distinguished from that of a surveillance system. Usually, in
communications systems, the transmitter intended that a specific receiver
or specific class of receivers should have access to the information sent,
whereas the transmitting (or modulating) instrumentality in the surveillance system had no such intent. Conversely, the surveillance system
receiver intended to find out what the surveillance transmitter system had
no intent to reveal. With modern developments, particularly in active
surveillance systems, this distinction is no longer valid.
To illustrate the growing ambiguity of intent as a distinguishing feature
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between communications and surveillance, four systems are considered.
These are: (1) point-to-point military communications system, (2)
broadcast communication system, (3) active surveillance system and (4)
passive surveillance system.
In a point-to-point military system the transmitting instrumentality intends the information sent to be restricted to a limited class of receivers.
This intent is often manifested by transmitting encrypted messages, controlling the directivity of transmission, or limiting severely the time of
transmission.
In a broadcast communication system the transmitting instrumentality
using a high power transmitter usually has the intent to present its message
to as large a number of receivers as possible, but there may exist certain
qualifications on this intent. For example, broadcasting may be done in
a language known to a select group, or a secret code may be used. The receiving instrumentalities in this system may be a very large number of
individuals operating home receivers.
The transmitting instrumentality of an active surveillance system intends to have the transmitted beam modulated with information about
an object or unknown mass and have the modulated beam transmitted to
a receiver. Although the transmitting instrumentality intends its transmission for one or a very few selected receivers, it may be indifferent to
the numbers of unauthorized receivers picking up signals. Several types
of intent may be illustrated by the modulating instrumentality. For example, a crater on the moon is incapable of formulating any intent regarding its modulating radar signals. The instrumentality controlling a
classified military vehicle, on the other hand, may be assumed to intend
concealing it from the radar beam. In still other instances the modulating
instrumentality may intend actively to aid the radar beam in illuminating
an object by providing an augmenter to enhance the return signal. In
the latter application, the resulting system, although it uses the techniques
of surveillance, is on a poorly defined borderline between surveillance
and communications.
In passive surveillance systems variations in intent are also conceivable
on the part of the modulating instrumentality, although in many instances
the transmitting instrumentality is indifferent to the requirements of the
receiver. For example, in lunar photography systems, the transmitting
instrumentality is the sun which illuminates the moon, the modulating
instrumentality. Neither of these are capable of formulating an intent
regarding transmission of information to the receiving photographic
system. The sun also illuminates ballistic missile emplacements, but the
modulating instrumentality, the deployer of such weapons, may employ
all the methods of concealment available to him to prevent the modulation of sunlight in such a way as to permit the user of the surveillance
system to gain information. Sometimes systems are used in which the
transmitting instrumentality actively seeks to cooperate with the receiver.
For example, the illumination of satellites or balloons with flares enables
optical tracking systems on earth to follow them easily. Again, such
surveillance systems as these are hardly distinguishable from communications systems.
Examples such as the four above can be multiplied, but they will only
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serve to point out that intent, which gave promise of distinguishing communications from surveillance systems, is incapable of doing so."
The following four principles are presented as a tentative code of the
law of space communications and space surveillance. An attempt has been
made to restrict the principles only to aspects of space law specifically
pertinent to communications and surveillance, thus eliminating consideration of subject matter, such as damages, which have broader application.
All of the principles are implicit in the literature of space law. The first
three summarize the rights and duties of a State operating electromagnetic
equipment in regions under its own jurisdiction, in regions under the
jurisdiction of other States, and in regions not subject to national appropriation. The fourth principle imposes a qualification on the first three
principles and further restricts the rights of States.
1. From regions within its own jurisdiction a State has a right to
propagate electromagnetic radiation in any manner and at any frequency
not contrary to international law and may use electromagnetic receivers,
detectors, or sensors of any frequency to collect information.
2. From regions under the jurisdiction of another State, a State without authorization has no right either to propagate electromagnetic radiation or to collect electromagnetic radiation, except as permitted under
international law.
3. From regions not subject to national appropriation, a State has a
right to cause electromagnetic radiation to impinge on the territory or
airspace of another State, except that broadcasting is prohibited. In such
regions as State may receive electromagnetic radiation emanating from
any region of the universe, but has no right to use or to interfere with
operation of electromagnetic equipment not its own, except as permitted
by international law.
4. At all times, a State has a duty to refrain from radiating any region
of the universe in such a manner as to be physically harmful, or potentially
physically harmful, to inhabitants of that region or their works and to
refrain from emitting radiation in such a manner as to be wasteful of
bandwidth in the electromagnetic spectrum.
The principles above are graded so that the State has the greatest
freedom of action in operating from its own territory and airspace and
the least freedom of action when operating from the territory or airspace
of a non-cooperating nation. Under all circumstances, the State must
utilize care to avoid physical harm to inhabitants or material goods of
regions it radiates.
As is implied in the first principle, there is little restriction on activities which a State can conduct on its own territory. A State may use
1 The above discussion suggests, however, that a distinction might be made in the law, not in
accordance with the user's desire to employ electromagnetic spectrum for surveillance purposes
or for communication purposes, but in accordance with the transmitting or modulating instrumentality's intent or lack of intent to withhold informatoin from unauthorized receivers.
Analysis of this proposition, which is outside the scope of this paper, leads to results which
would require great change in existing customary international law. See Beresford, Surveillance
Aircraft and Satellites: A Problem of International Law, 27 J. Air L. & Com. 112 (1960).
A similar proposition applied to the intent of the receiving instrumentality is implied in
the 1962 U.S.S.R. Draft Declaration of the Basic Principles Governing the Activities of States
Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, wherein it is provided: "8. The use of
artificial satellites for the collection of intelligence information in the territory of foreign States
is incompatible with the objectives of mankind in its conquest of outer space." (U.N. Doc. No.
A/Ac. 105/L2).
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transmitters and receivers most freely. It may use such devices as telescopes to collect information from its neighbors and even direct radar
beams into the territory of unfriendly nations. As Beresford has stated
in commenting on the U-2 incident, "... . it has been long possible to peer
across the frontiers of another country by means of radar. Although it
might well be considered a penetration of territorial integrity, radar
scrutiny is apparently accepted by all nations."' "
Although the use of transmitters by a State within its own territory
is limited by ITU regulations, the State receiving the foreign transmission
has the right to jam under two theories. Under the first, the State can
jam because it has sovereignty over the airspace; under the second, it
can jam because it has the right to protect the security of the State.
Jamming of point-to-point radio not intended for reception in the jamming country obviously can be sustained more easily under the sovereignty
theory, because the security of the State is unlikely to be involved in
most point-to-point transmissions. 3 Jamming of broadcast transmissions
is conceivable under either theory.
Jamming or conducting countermeasures against radar transmissions is
another right of the State against which radar surveillance is directed.
Since the transmission carries no intelligence per se, it cannot be a threat
to security in the same sense that broadcast information can be. Nevertheless, radar surveillance is a type of espionage and, although espionage
is not prohibited by international law," such surveillance can be countered
as a threat to security.
A growing field of endeavor is related to ground-based surveillance
systems. Although the passive systems such as the radio telescopes and
optical tracking systems used to detect radiation either from distant
celestial objects or from man-made objects launched from earth raise few
legal problems, the active systems cannot be expected to respect arbitrarily
drawn boundary lines on earth or in the airspace.
The second principle is a broadly prohibitive one which recognizes the
sovereignty of a State within its own boundaries and in the airspace above
it. The perhaps unnecessary clause at the end of the sentence "except as
permitted under international law" is inserted to emphasize the hope that
arms control agreements can ultimately be reached which provide for
some abrogation of the unlimited right of sovereignty. This principle
would prohibit unauthorized incursions into the territory of airspace of
another nation for the purpose of using space surveillance or communications devices.
Under the third principle, where equipment is being operated from
regions not subject to national appropriation, there is no limitation on
emplacement of receivers or passive trackers of any kind. The right to
radiate electromagnetic waves, however, may be restricted by extension
of a rule of the International Telecommunication Union adopted May 1,
1961. This rule states that: "The establishment and use of broadcasting
l Beresford, supra note 11, at 114.
13Estep and Kearse, Space Communications and the Law, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 873
The essential problem is defined as the impact of the radio transmission on the
State. States should be forbidden to jam by disabling a satellite transmitter.
14 See Reconnaissance in Air and Outer Space, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1074 (1961).

(1962).
receiving
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stations on board ships, aircraft, or any other floating or airborne objects
outside national territories is prohibited.""
Since space and celestial bodies, according to the U.N. resolution of
December 20, 1961," are not capable of national appropriation, any transmitter operated in space must be operated outside a national territory,
therefore: "Itis not clear how one could continue to prohibit broadcasting
.. from ships or aircraft situated outside national territories . . . and not
impose the slightest restriction on broadcasting from satellites."'
Can such restriction on electromagnetic emission be extended to cover
any electromagnetic radiation from a vehicle or satellite in space? To
impose such a restriction would make impossible the exploration of space
by man, since he is dependent upon receiving from earth instructions and
vehicle guidance and must be able to communicate status information
back to earth. Nor can unmanned exploration of the universe proceed
because such a restriction would make necessary the return of a vehicle
or a probe launched into space back to the earth or at least into a national
airspace before it would be permitted to divulge the information collected.
To prevent chaos in transmission through the earth's atmosphere, frequency control at least as effective as exists on the earth's surface and
airspace will be required in outer space. Fortunately, the International
Telecommunications Union will hold an Extraordinary Administrative
Radio conference in Geneva, Switzerland, in October, 1963, for the purpose of considering frequency requirements and allocations for operating
communications." Significantly, radio astronomy, which is a surveillance
rather than a communications function, will be an agenda item.
Under the proposed third principle, radar could be used freely in outer
space as a surveillance means. Currently, the right to use radar in a
satellite as an earth surveillance sensor is somewhat academic, since microwave radar seems to have insufficient resolution capability to be worth
the effort of putting it in orbit. Nevertheless, the developing higher frequency systems using infrared or visible light do not suffer from the
resolution limitations of mocrowave radar. On the other hand, the severe
attenuation experienced by these waves in going through the atmosphere
may make the use of surveillance radar infeasible at these frequencies also.
The passive systems have far more interesting surveillance capabilities,
and principle three would permit unlimited use of passive systems in
space. These systems include meteorological sensors, usually infrared or
visible light sensitive devices for photographing cloud and storm formations in the earth's atmosphere, photographic and TV sensors for earth
surveillance, telescopes and radiometers for astrophysical parameter determinations, and many other systems. The sensors directed away from
the earth toward the sun or toward other celestial objects and even manmade objects in space will cause less controversy than those sensors directed
toward the earth.
The Soviet Union has objected to the use of photographic and other
"intelligence gathering satellites." Nevertheless, it would be difficult to
reconcile such a viewpoint with established practice of gathering reconinternational Radio Regulations, art. 7, par. I (I).
Gen. Ass. Res. 1721 (XVI) (A/5100).
17 Persin, Will Space be Open to Piracy, 30 Telecommunication J. 14 (1963).
"s29 Telecommunications Rep. 13 (1963).

"'U.N.
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naissance data over international waters. To quote Beresford: "Highaltitude aircraft flying over friendly lands or international waters can
use air sampling techniques to detect nuclear explosion on foreign soil and
can make recording of foreign radio and radar transmission."1 High
and low level photography from aircraft flying over international
waters or friendly lands is a practice long engaged in by many nations. Under these conditions application of a different rule to outer
space where national sovereignty does not exist is unwarranted. Successful use of communications satellites will depend upon agreements
between the State controlling the satellite and other using States. Without
such agreement, mutual interference between would-be satellite users is
almost inevitable.
The practical consequences of the fourth principle regarding harmful
electromagnetic radiation applies on earth primarily to frequencies above
the microwave region. As frequencies increase toward the X-Ray and
gamma-ray region of the spectum, higher and higher energy particles are
produced. With the production of coherent infrared and visible frequencies, concentration of energy in the form of heat may also be dangerous to human beings. As more effective use is made of these higher
frequencies, greater care must be exercised to avoid the dangers inherent
in intense heat and high energy. Such effects may be noted in high power
radar and communications transmitters for earth-space service. Because of
the protection of the earth's atmosphere, there is little danger of harm
resulting on earth as a result of transmissions from space.
It is in space-to-space communications and surveillance that this problem may become severe. The beam of a high power transmitter emitting
at infrared or X-Ray frequencies could probably destroy a human being,
a satellite, or a probe at considerable distance. The affects of even lower
frequencies or other types of life and societies we may encounter in the
universe cannot be forecast."0
Caution must be exercised not only to avoid causing physical harm but
also to avoid wasteful use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Such wasteful
use may occur either through failure to observe rules of the ITU or other
regulatory bodies, or through failure to provide means for turning off
solar-powered space transmitters after they have served their intended
purposes.
With the increasing availability of higher frequencies and the desirability of using them in space, the problem of frequency control may have
been overcome because of the potentially millions of channels available
for use and because of the development of modulation schemes which may
make specific channel assignments unnecessary. In place of frequency
control, however, there will arise a new and very formidable problem of
energy control.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

Four tentative principles of space law are proposed to cover both space
communications and space surveillance. Damages, violation of airspace,
" Beresford, supra note 11, at 114.
" See Haley, Recent Developments in Space Law and Metalaw, 24 Harv. L. Rec.
7, 1957); reprinted in Doc. No. 26, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1961).
"sU.N. Gen. Ass. Doc. No. A/4141, pt. II, para. 72 (1959).
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and other problems have been deliberately avoided as not specifically related to communications and surveillance, but to a broader field of space
law. The list of principles is neither authoritative nor exhaustive. Yet,
the formulation of tentative codes or sets of principles may serve a useful
function in crystallizing thought and defining issues.
A natural consequence of the joint consideration of communications and
surveillance would be broadened regulatory action by the United Nations
Specialized Agencies. The ITU has already moved in this direction by
considering a major space surveillance function-radio astronomy.
As technology grows, the bitterly contested points of yesteryear may
well prove to be irrelevant. Thus, any proposed principles need constant
review and revision. Eventually, some of them may withstand the cor-

rosive effects of time.

